How the US and China must adapt statecraft to Southeast Asia

As Donald Trump returns to the White House later this month, changes to US foreign security and economic approaches will have profound implications for America’s standing in the world, not least in Southeast Asia. Whether Trump’s "America First" agenda means scaling down its regional military obligations, getting allies and partners to shore up their own defenses rather than depend on the United States, ramping up economic sanctions against China, or imposing higher tariffs on countries with trade surpluses against the United States, much uncertainty clouds the future of US policy. Southeast Asia, a region that is increasingly pivotal amidst an intensifying competition between the United States and China, will need to adapt in response.

Strategic diversification as a core principle

By most measures, China has already completed a regional power transition, with regional distribution of material capabilities and wealth changing rapidly over the past generation. For instance, China’s share of East Asia’s gross domestic product grew from 7% in 1988 to nearly 60% in 2022, while Japan’s fell from 72% in 1988 to 14% in the same timeframe. Instead of fearing China’s economic and geopolitical rise, Southeast Asian states have mostly viewed China’s economic growth as a strategic opportunity.¹ It has not only helped them financially but also encouraged China to bilaterally and multilaterally engage in the region, including through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). To some extent, policymakers in the region hope that continued engagement over time would spur Beijing to adopt peaceful, norms-based behavior and reevaluate its own approach to regional conflicts. Moreover, an active Chinese presence allows Southeast Asian states to pursue economic and geopolitical diversification, preventing over-reliance on the United States. At the same time, it provides a strategic rationale for Southeast Asian states to maintain US commitment to the region, assuaging their concerns about Washington potentially abandoning, and thereby destabilizing, the region.

Why Southeast Asia matters

Amidst the disruptive forces of the growing imbalance of power in the region, it is easy to simply focus on Great Powers’ prerogatives and interests. Doing so without taking into consideration how smaller states react and respond to such dynamics, however, overlooks the understated importance of how negotiated power works in international politics in two significant ways. First, it is not always the case, as the adage claims, that "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must." After all, a large power’s authority cannot be realized through brute force alone. Coercion as a means of demonstrating strength might be politically convenient and expedient, but it is costly to maintain over time and often undercuts a state’s ability to wield actual influence. A more enduring form of leadership and influence derives from validation and acceptance by others, a critical aspect of relational power which is much more difficult to attain than material strength.

Indeed, when smaller states confer upon a larger state the recognition of regional or global leadership, it comes with the expectation of its providing order and upholding — or at least not undermining — the existing norms of regional security and trade.⁶ In short, small states possess an influence with which large, powerful states must contend. It is precisely for this reason that Southeast Asian states matter. Far from being inconsequential, states in the region can provide and confer the legitimacy the United States and China desire.⁷ In short, given that self-legitimation is an oxymoron, it stands to reason that whether the United States or China’s behavior is deemed desirable depends largely on affirmation by Southeast Asian states.

Second, in light of growing concerns about a new arms race in Asia, many observers see the region as ripe for Great Power rivalry, with the debate over whether China’s rise would instill fear in its Asian neighbors mounting in the past two decades.⁸ A closer look at the region’s military expenditure, however, reveals that Southeast Asian states are not engaging in all-out deterrence in response to China’s rise.⁹ This is not to say that the region is embracing China’s rise without any questions or concerns, but that it is instead focused on engaging Beijing through diplomatic and multilateral means and keeping channels of communication open to better assess Beijing’s intentions and longer-term ambitions.

Looking ahead

As the US-China strategic competition intensifies, it is increasingly important to accurately understand how Southeast Asian states think. Indeed, it is often easy to misread them if one only looks through the perspective of Washington or Beijing. The increasing reliance on military capabilities by the United States and China to assert their dominance in the region is not conducive for regional stability. In fact, the jostling for regional influence between the United States and China is exacerbating tensions and disrupting the regional order.

Getting Southeast Asia right means understanding the region’s commonsensical approach toward statecraft: ensuring maximum flexibility in its alignment options and facilitating mobility as and when necessary. The region undertakes constant adjustment to maintain this strategic positioning that gives states in Southeast Asia ample room to maneuver and helps them avoid making costly choices. Whether the United States or China has "won" in Southeast Asia remains a conclusion not yet foregone, but one that can be reached more quickly by being more attentive and responsive to the region’s preferences and priorities.

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[1] Evelyn Goh, "Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analysing Regional Security Strategies", International Security 32, no. 3 (2007/08): 113-57.
[2] Yuen Foong Khong, "Coping with Strategic Uncertainty: The Role of Institutions and Soft Balancing in Southeast Asia’s Post–Cold War Strategy", in Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power, and Efficiency, edited by J. J. Suh, Peter J. Katzenstein and Allen Carlson, (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004).
[3] See, for example: Alice Ba, "Is China leading? China, Southeast Asia and East Asian integration", Political Science 66, no. 2 (2014): 143-165; Darren J. Lim and Zack Cooper, "Reassessing Hedging: The Logic of Alignment in East Asia", Security Studies 24 (2015): 696-727.
[4] Michael Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia (London: Routledge, 1989).
[5] See, for example: Jurgen Haacke, "The Concept of Hedging and its Application to Southeast Asia: A Critique and a Proposal for a Modified Conceptual and Methodological Framework", International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 19, no. 3 (2019): 375-417; Cheng-Chwee Kuik, "How Do Weaker States Hedge? Unpacking ASEAN States’ Alignment Behavior Towards China", Journal of Contemporary China 25, no. 100 (2016): 500-514.
[6] David A. Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011).
[7] Chin-Hao Huang, Power and Restraint in China’s Rise (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2022).
[8] See, for example: Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia", International Security 18, no. 3 (1993): 5-33; John Mearsheimer, "The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia", Chinese Journal of International Politics 3 (2010): 381-396); Avery Goldstein, "First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in US-China Relations", International Security 37, no. 4 (2013): 49-89.
[9] Chin-Hao Huang and Selina Ho, "Domestic Determinants of Southeast Asia’s Relations with the United States and China," Contemporary Southeast Asia, 46(1): 1-19.

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